ON DREAMS

WE must, in the next place, investigate the subject of the dream,

and first inquire to which of the faculties of the soul it presents

itself, i.e. whether the affection is one which pertains to the

faculty of intelligence or to that of sense-perception; for these

are the only faculties within us by which we acquire knowledge.

If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing,

that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the

faculty of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some

perceptions common to the senses, such as figure, magnitude, motion,

&c., while there are others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar [each

to its own sense]; and further, if all creatures, when the eyes are

closed in sleep, are unable to see, and the analogous statement is

true of the other senses, so that manifestly we perceive nothing

when asleep; we may conclude that it is not by sense-perception we

perceive a dream.

But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams] we not

only assert, e.g. that some object approaching is a man or a horse

[which would be an exercise of opinion], but that the object is

white or beautiful, points on which opinion without sense-perception

asserts nothing either truly or falsely. It is, however, a fact that

the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally well

that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In

dreams], too, we think something else, over and above the dream

presentation, just as we do in waking moments when we perceive

something; for we often also reason about that which we perceive.

So, too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere

phantasms immediately before our minds. This would be manifest to

any one who should attend and try, immediately on arising from

sleep, to remember [his dreaming experience]. There are cases of

persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe

themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according

to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in

something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which

they envisage into its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not

every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream-image, and that the

further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the

faculty of opinion.

So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty

by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by

disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in

sleep. So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the

facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to

them to be only a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty

of the soul be identical with, or different from, the faculty of

sense-perception, in either case the illusion does not occur without

our actually seeing or [otherwise] perceiving something. Even to see

wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one who sees or hears

something real, though not exactly what he supposes. But we have

assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears, nor exercises any

sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that the dreamer sees

nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception is

unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other

senses may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of

these affections, as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in

a certain manner to his [primary] faculty of sense, though not in

precisely the same manner as when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion

says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object

seen is an illusion; at other times it is inhibited, and becomes a

mere follower of the phantasm.

It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name 'dreaming',

is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an

affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were

the latter it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the

simple sense.

How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to

examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the

affection [of dreaming] pertains to sense-perception as surely as

sleep itself does. For sleep does not pertain to one organ in

animals and dreaming to another; both pertain to the same organ.

But since we have, in our work On the Soul, treated of presentation,

and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of

sense-perception, though the essential notion of a faculty of

presentation is different from that of a faculty of

sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a

sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a

dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in

sleep-whether simply or in some particular way-is what we call a

dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the

faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua

presentative.



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We can best obtain a scientific view of the nature of the dream

and the manner in which it originates by regarding it in the light

of the circumstances attending sleep. The objects of

sense-perception corresponding to each sensory organ produce

sense-perception in us, and the affection due to their operation is

present in the organs of sense not only when the perceptions are

actualized, but even when they have departed.

What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in the

case of projectiles moving in space. For in the case of these the

movement continues even when that which set up the movement is no

longer in contact [with the things that are moved]. For that which set

them in motion moves a certain portion of air, and this, in turn,

being moved excites motion in another portion; and so, accordingly, it

is in this way that [the bodies], whether in air or in liquids,

continue moving, until they come to a standstill.

This we must likewise assume to happen in the case of qualitative

change; for that part which [for example] has been heated by something

hot, heats [in turn] the part next to it, and this propagates the

affection continuously onwards until the process has come round to its

oint of origination. This must also happen in the organ wherein the

exercise of sense-perception takes place, since sense-perception, as

realized in actual perceiving, is a mode of qualitative change. This

explains why the affection continues in the sensory organs, both in

their deeper and in their more superficial parts, not merely while

they are actually engaged in perceiving, but even after they have

ceased to do so. That they do this, indeed, is obvious in cases

where we continue for some time engaged in a particular form of

perception, for then, when we shift the scene of our perceptive

activity, the previous affection remains; for instance, when we have

turned our gaze from sunlight into darkness. For the result of this is

that one sees nothing, owing to the excited by the light still

subsisting in our eyes. Also, when we have looked steadily for a

long while at one colour, e.g. at white or green, that to which we

next transfer our gaze appears to be of the same colour. Again if,

after having looked at the sun or some other brilliant object, we

close the eyes, then, if we watch carefully, it appears in a right

line with the direction of vision (whatever this may be), at first

in its own colour; then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until

it becomes black and disappears. And also when persons turn away

from looking at objects in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially those

which flow very rapidly, they find that the visual stimulations

still present themselves, for the things really at rest are then

seen moving: persons become very deaf after hearing loud noises, and

after smelling very strong odours their power of smelling is impaired;

and similarly in other cases. These phenomena manifestly take place in

the way above described.

That the sensory organs are acutely sensitive to even a slight

qualitative difference [in their objects] is shown by what happens

in the case of mirrors; a subject to which, even taking it

independently, one might devote close consideration and inquiry. At

the same time it becomes plain from them that as the eye [in seeing]

is affected [by the object seen], so also it produces a certain effect

upon it. If a woman chances during her menstrual period to look into a

highly polished mirror, the surface of it will grow cloudy with a

blood-coloured haze. It is very hard to remove this stain from a new

mirror, but easier to remove from an older mirror. As we have said

before, the cause of this lies in the fact that in the act of sight

there occurs not only a passion in the sense organ acted on by the

polished surface, but the organ, as an agent, also produces an action,

as is proper to a brilliant object. For sight is the property of an

organ possessing brilliance and colour. The eyes, therefore, have

their proper action as have other parts of the body. Because it is

natural to the eye to be filled with blood-vessels, a woman's eyes,

during the period of menstrual flux and inflammation, will undergo a

change, although her husband will not note this since his seed is of

the same nature as that of his wife. The surrounding atmosphere,

through which operates the action of sight, and which surrounds the

mirror also, will undergo a change of the same sort that occurred

shortly before in the woman's eyes, and hence the surface of the

mirror is likewise affected. And as in the case of a garment, the

cleaner it is the more quickly it is soiled, so the same holds true in

the case of the mirror. For anything that is clean will show quite

clearly a stain that it chances to receive, and the cleanest object

shows up even the slightest stain. A bronze mirror, because of its

shininess, is especially sensitive to any sort of contact (the

movement of the surrounding air acts upon it like a rubbing or

pressing or wiping); on that account, therefore, what is clean will

show up clearly the slightest touch on its surface. It is hard to

cleanse smudges off new mirrors because the stain penetrates deeply

and is suffused to all parts; it penetrates deeply because the

mirror is not a dense medium, and is suffused widely because of the

smoothness of the object. On the other hand, in the case of old

mirrors, stains do not remain because they do not penetrate deeply,

but only smudge the surface.

From this therefore it is plain that stimulatory motion is set up

even by slight differences, and that sense-perception is quick to

respond to it; and further that the organ which perceives colour is

not only affected by its object, but also reacts upon it. Further

evidence to the same point is afforded by what takes place in wines,

and in the manufacture of unguents. For both oil, when prepared, and

wine become rapidly infected by the odours of the things near them;

they not only acquire the odours of the things thrown into or mixed

with them, but also those of the things which are placed, or which

grow, near the vessels containing them.

In order to answer our original question, let us now, therefore,

assume one proposition, which is clear from what precedes, viz. that

even when the external object of perception has departed, the

impressions it has made persist, and are themselves objects of

perception: and [let us assume], besides, that we are easily

deceived respecting the operations of sense-perception when we are

excited by emotions, and different persons according to their

different emotions; for example, the coward when excited by fear,

the amorous person by amorous desire; so that, with but little

resemblance to go upon, the former thinks he sees his foes

approaching, the latter, that he sees the object of his desire; and

the more deeply one is under the influence of the emotion, the less

similarity is required to give rise to these illusory impressions.

Thus too, both in fits of anger, and also in all states of appetite,

all men become easily deceived, and more so the more their emotions

are excited. This is the reason too why persons in the delirium of

fever sometimes think they see animals on their chamber walls, an

illusion arising from the faint resemblance to animals of the markings

thereon when put together in patterns; and this sometimes

corresponds with the emotional states of the sufferers, in such a

way that, if the latter be not very ill, they know well enough that it

is an illusion; but if the illness is more severe they actually move

according to the appearances. The cause of these occurrences is that

the faculty in virtue of which the controlling sense judges is not

identical with that in virtue of which presentations come before the

mind. A proof of this is, that the sun presents itself as only a

foot in diameter, though often something else gainsays the

presentation. Again, when the fingers are crossed, the one object

[placed between them] is felt [by the touch] as two; but yet we deny

that it is two; for sight is more authoritative than touch. Yet, if

touch stood alone, we should actually have pronounced the one object

to be two. The ground of such false judgements is that any appearances

whatever present themselves, not only when its object stimulates a

sense, but also when the sense by itself alone is stimulated, provided

only it be stimulated in the same manner as it is by the object. For

example, to persons sailing past the land seems to move, when it is

really the eye that is being moved by something else [the moving ship.]

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From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon

sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external

objects or from causes within the body, present themselves not only

when persons are awake, but also then, when this affection which is

called sleep has come upon them, with even greater impressiveness. For

by day, while the senses and the intellect are working together,

they (i.e. such movements) are extruded from consciousness or

obscured, just as a smaller is beside a larger fire, or as small

beside great pains or pleasures, though, as soon as the latter have

ceased, even those which are trifling emerge into notice. But by night

[i.e. in sleep] owing to the inaction of the particular senses, and

their powerlessness to realize themselves, which arises from the

reflux of the hot from the exterior parts to the interior, they

[i.e. the above 'movements'] are borne in to the head quarters of

sense-perception, and there display themselves as the disturbance

(of waking life) subsides. We must suppose that, like the little

eddies which are being ever formed in rivers, so the sensory movements

are each a continuous process, often remaining like what they were

when first started, but often, too, broken into other forms by

collisions with obstacles. This [last mentioned point], moreover,

gives the reason why no dreams occur in sleep immediately after meals,

or to sleepers who are extremely young, e.g. to infants. The

internal movement in such cases is excessive, owing to the heat

generated from the food. Hence, just as in a liquid, if one vehemently

disturbs it, sometimes no reflected image appears, while at other

times one appears, indeed, but utterly distorted, so as to seem

quite unlike its original; while, when once the motion has ceased, the

reflected images are clear and plain; in the same manner during

sleep the phantasms, or residuary movements, which are based upon

the sensory impressions, become sometimes quite obliterated by the

above described motion when too violent; while at other times the

sights are indeed seen, but confused and weird, and the dreams

[which then appear] are unhealthy, like those of persons who are

atrabilious, or feverish, or intoxicated with wine. For all such

affections, being spirituous, cause much commotion and disturbance. In

sanguineous animals, in proportion as the blood becomes calm, and as

its purer are separated from its less pure elements, the fact that the

movement, based on impressions derived from each of the organs of

sense, is preserved in its integrity, renders the dreams healthy,

causes a [clear] image to present itself, and makes the dreamer think,

owing to the effects borne in from the organ of sight, that he

actually sees, and owing to those which come from the organ of

hearing, that he really hears; and so on with those also which proceed

from the other sensory organs. For it is owing to the fact that the

movement which reaches the primary organ of sense comes from them,

that one even when awake believes himself to see, or hear, or

otherwise perceive; just as it is from a belief that the organ of

sight is being stimulated, though in reality not so stimulated, that

we sometimes erroneously declare ourselves to see, or that, from the

fact that touch announces two movements, we think that the one

object is two. For, as a rule, the governing sense affirms the

report of each particular sense, unless another particular sense, more

authoritative, makes a contradictory report. In every case an

appearance presents itself, but what appears does not in every case

seem real, unless when the deciding faculty is inhibited, or does

not move with its proper motion. Moreover, as we said that different

men are subject to illusions, each according to the different

emotion present in him, so it is that the sleeper, owing to sleep, and

to the movements then going on in his sensory organs, as well as to

the other facts of the sensory process, [is liable to illusion], so

that the dream presentation, though but little like it, appears as

some actual given thing. For when one is asleep, in proportion as most

of the blood sinks inwards to its fountain [the heart], the internal

[sensory] movements, some potential, others actual accompany it

inwards. They are so related [in general] that, if anything move the

blood, some one sensory movement will emerge from it, while if this

perishes another will take its place; while to one another also they

are related in the same way as the artificial frogs in water which

severally rise [in fixed succesion] to the surface in the order in

which the salt [which keeps them down] becomes dissolved. The

residuary movements are like these: they are within the soul

potentially, but actualize themselves only when the impediment to

their doing so has been relaxed; and according as they are thus set

free, they begin to move in the blood which remains in the sensory

organs, and which is now but scanty, while they possess verisimilitude

after the manner of cloud-shapes, which in their rapid metamorphoses

one compares now to human beings and a moment afterwards to

centaurs. Each of them is however, as has been said, the remnant of

a sensory impression taken when sense was actualizing itself; and when

this, the true impression, has departed, its remnant is still

immanent, and it is correct to say of it, that though not actually

Koriskos, it is like Koriskos. For when the person was actually

perceiving, his controlling and judging sensory faculty did not call

it Koriskos, but, prompted by this [impression], called the genuine

person yonder Koriskos. Accordingly, this sensory impulse, which, when

actually perceiving, it [the controlling faculty] describes (unless

completely inhibited by the blood), it now [in dreams] when

quasi-perceiving, receives from the movements persisting in the

sense-organs, and mistakes it-an impulse that is merely like the

true [objective] impression-for the true impression itself, while

the effect of sleep is so great that it causes this mistake to pass

unnoticed. Accordingly, just as if a finger be inserted beneath the

eyeball without being observed, one object will not only present two

visual images, but will create an opinion of its being two objects;

while if it [the finger] be observed, the presentation will be the

same, but the same opinion will not be formed of it; exactly so it

is in states of sleep: if the sleeper perceives that he is asleep, and

is conscious of the sleeping state during which the perception comes

before his mind, it presents itself still, but something within him

speaks to this effect: 'the image of Koriskos presents itself, but the

real Koriskos is not present'; for often, when one is asleep, there is

something in consciousness which declares that what then presents

itself is but a dream. If, however, he is not aware of being asleep,

there is nothing which will contradict the testimony of the bare

presentation.

That what we here urge is true, i.e. that there are such

presentative movements in the sensory organs, any one may convince

himself, if he attends to and tries to remember the affections we

experience when sinking into slumber or when being awakened. He will

sometimes, in the moment of awakening, surprise the images which

present themselves to him in sleep, and find that they are really

but movements lurking in the organs of sense. And indeed some very

young persons, if it is dark, though looking with wide open eyes,

see multitudes of phantom figures moving before them, so that they

often cover up their heads in terror.

From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is, that the dream

is a sort of presentation, and, more particularly, one which occurs in

sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any

other a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are

in a state of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep

necessarily a dream. For in the first place, some persons [when

asleep] actually, in a certain way, perceive sounds, light, savour,

and contact; feebly, however, and, as it were, remotely. For there

have been cases in which persons while asleep, but with the eyes

partly open, saw faintly in their sleep (as they supposed) the light

of a lamp, and afterwards, on being awakened, straightway recognized

it as the actual light of a real lamp; while, in other cases,

persons who faintly heard the crowing of cocks or the barking of

dogs identified these clearly with the real sounds as soon as they

awoke. Some persons, too, return answers to questions put to them in

sleep. For it is quite possible that, of waking or sleeping, while the

one is present in the ordinary sense, the other also should be present

in a certain way. But none of these occurrences should be called a

dream. Nor should the true thoughts, as distinct from the mere

presentations, which occur in sleep [be called dreams]. The dream

proper is a presentation based on the movement of sense impressions,

when such presentation occurs during sleep, taking sleep in the strict

sense of the term.

There are cases of persons who in their whole lives have never had a

dream, while others dream when considerably advanced in years,

having never dreamed before. The cause of their not having dreams

appears somewhat like that which operates in the case of infants, and

[that which operates] immediately after meals. It is intelligible

enough that no dream-presentation should occur to persons whose

natural constitution is such that in them copious evaporation is borne

upwards, which, when borne back downwards, causes a large quantity of

motion. But it is not surprising that, as age advances, a dream should

at length appear to them. Indeed, it is inevitable that, as a change

is wrought in them in proportion to age or emotional experience, this

reversal [from non-dreaming to dreaming] should occur also.

THE END

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